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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 1954
74 Supreme Court Reporter, p. 686-693
347 U.S. 483 BROWN ET AL. V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY,
KAN., ET AL.
BRIGGS ET AL. V. ELLOITT ET AL.
DAVIS ET AL. V. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VA., ET AL.
GEBHART ET AL. V. BELTON ET AL.
Reargued Dec. 7, 8, 9, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.
No. 10:
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Delaware. They are premised on different
facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies
their consideration together in this consolidated
opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives,
seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.
In each instance, they have been denied
admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of
the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court
denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called
"separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256.
Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though
these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that
the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority
to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal"
and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance
of the question presented, the Court took
jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard
this Term on certain questions propounded by
the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It
covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification
by the states, then existing practices in racial
segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment.
This discussion and our own investigation
convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough
to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At
best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all
legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished
them to have the most limited effect. What others in
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with
and degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history,
with respect to segregated schools, is the status of
public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common
schools, supported by general taxation, had not
yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of
private groups. Education of Negroes was almost
nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any
education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some
states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success
in the arts and sciences as well as in the business
and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time
of the Amendment had advanced further in the North,
but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored
in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the
conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today.
The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded
schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months
a year in many states; and compulsory school
attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising
that there should be so little in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment,
decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it
as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race.
The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its
appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra,
involving not education but transportation.
American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century.
In this Court, there have been six cases involving
the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education.
In Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175
U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197, 44 L.Ed. 262, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78,
48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172, the validity of the
doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate
school level, inequality was found in that specific
benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the
same educational qualifications. State of Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208; Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,
332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149. In none
of these cases was it necessary to re-examine
the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter,
supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the
question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public
education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike
Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized,
with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision,
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We
must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on
public education.
[1] In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Fersugon was written. We must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
[2] Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
[3] We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may
be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra [339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 850], in finding
that a segregated law school for Negroes could not
provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large
part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra [339 U.S. 637,
70 S.Ct. 853], the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again
resorted to intangible considerations: "* * * his ability to study,
to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students, and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations
apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The
effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated
by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental] development
of Negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Fersugon contrary to this finding is rejected.
[4] We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have
been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion
whether such segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[5] Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems
of considerable complexity. On reargument, the
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the
primary question
the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have
now announced that such segregation is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance
of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases
will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present
further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously
propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney
General of the United States is again invited to
participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting
segregation in public education will also be
permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September
15, 1954, and submission of briefs of October
1, 1954.
It is so ordered.
Cases ordered restored to docket for further argument on question of appropriate decrees.
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